The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process
Volume 16

Issue 2

Article 5

2015

Preservation Rules in the Federal Courts of Appeals
Ian S. Speir
Nima H. Mohebbi

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/appellatepracticeprocess
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
Ian S. Speir and Nima H. Mohebbi, Preservation Rules in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 16 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 281 (2015).
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/appellatepracticeprocess/vol16/iss2/5

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has
been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process by an authorized administrator of
Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu.

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 72 Side A

05/10/2016 12:12:25

SPEIRMOHEBBIRESEND2 (DO NOT DELETE)

5/9/2016 5:38 PM

PRESERVATION RULES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
OF APPEALS
Ian S. Speir and Nima H. Mohebbi*
I. INTRODUCTION

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS Vol. 16, No. 2 (Fall 2015)

05/10/2016 12:12:25

*Both authors are former Tenth Circuit law clerks. Ian Speir is a litigation associate with
Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and holds a J.D. from the
Georgetown University Law Center. Nima Mohebbi is a litigation associate with Latham &
Watkins LLP in Los Angeles, and holds a J.D. from the University of Pennsylvania Law
School. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ alone.
1. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 487 n.6 (2008) (internal quotation
marks and internal citation omitted).
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Litigation is a long journey, and legal arguments are
perishable goods. Before beginning the journey, attorneys must
consider not only which arguments to take with them, but also
how to preserve those arguments for both trial and appeal.
Appellate courts, particularly the federal courts of appeals, have
developed a sophisticated, often complex, and sometimes
conflicting set of preservation rules. These are part of the
“winnowing process” of litigation, the “machinery by which
courts narrow what remains to be decided.”1
Preservation rules are a key component of every advocate’s
toolkit. Trial counsel must know them. Appellate attorneys must
use them. But the rules can also be a trap for the unwary.
Sometimes, the argument that might have won on appeal wasn’t
timely or adequately raised at trial, and it doesn’t survive the
journey.
This article surveys preservation rules in the federal courts
of appeals, focusing in particular on the Tenth Circuit, which has
addressed in detail some of the more peculiar iterations of
preservation principles. We begin by providing some brief
background on preservation, then delve into the related doctrines
of waiver, forfeiture, and plain error. We next explore legal
contexts in which these doctrines either do not apply or have
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unique application, such as subject-matter jurisdiction, sovereign
immunity, and objections to evidence. Finally, we examine
preservation rules in the context of appellate briefing.
This survey is designed to assist both trial and appellate
counsel as they navigate the federal courts’ preservation rules.
As important as the rules are, it’s critical to remember the
reasons behind them. Requiring parties to timely and adequately
raise the arguments they want the court to address vindicates
both structural and prudential values and ensures basic fairness
to all parties. Balanced against these objectives is the court’s
“insistence that obvious injustice be promptly redressed.”2 Each
of these considerations is in play when preservation is at issue.
Appellate counsel therefore has a unique opportunity: to argue
not only for application of a particular preservation rule, but to
explain to the court why, in a particular case, that rule serves the
interests it is designed to serve.
II. PRESERVATION BASICS

05/10/2016 12:12:25

2. United States v. Frost, 684 F.3d 963, 971–72 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting United
States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)).
3. NASA v. Nelson, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 746, 756 n.10 (2011) (quoting Carducci
v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J.) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 740, 749 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Ours is
an adversarial system of justice. The presumption, therefore, is to hold the parties
responsible for raising their own defenses.”).
4. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (“It is the general rule, of
course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below.”).
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Any discussion of preservation rules must begin with the
nature of our adversarial system. Courts depend on the parties,
as self-interested litigants, to raise the issues they want the court
to rule on. Courts typically do not decide, or even discuss, issues
that the parties have not raised. As the Supreme Court recently
put it, “[t]he premise of our adversarial system is that . . . courts
do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research,
but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and
argued by the parties before them.”3
The first place in which parties must raise their arguments
is the district court. As a general rule, an argument not first
presented to the district court is not a proper basis for appeal.4
As the Tenth Circuit has explained,
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[i]n order to preserve the integrity of the appellate structure,
we should not be considered a “second-shot” forum, a
forum where secondary, back-up theories may be mounted
for the first time. . . . Parties must be encouraged to “give it
5
everything they’ve got” at the trial level.

05/10/2016 12:12:25

5. Tele-Commc’ns, Inc. v. Comm’r, 104 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation
omitted).
6. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Pilatus Bus. Aircraft, Ltd., 582 F.3d 1131, 1142
(10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, Inc. v. LMC Holding Co., 497 F.3d
1135, 1141 (10th Cir. 2007)).
7. See, e.g., Grynberg v. Total, S.A., 538 F.3d 1336, 1351 (10th Cir. 2008).
8. U.S. Aviation, 582 F.3d at 1142.
9. 497 F.3d 1135, 1142 (10th Cir. 2007).
10. See, e.g., Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1130 (10th Cir. 2011).
11. Jordan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 668 F.3d 1188, 1200 (10th Cir. 2011). We say
“generally” because there are exceptions even to this rule. For example, in the Tenth
Circuit, the argument that the opposing party is estopped from litigating a particular issue
must be timely raised. If an appellee fails to timely raise an estoppel defense, the defense is
waived on appeal, and the court will proceed to the merits of the appellant’s argument. See
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To properly preserve an issue, a party must do more than simply
raise it. She must both “aler[t] the district court to the issue and
see[k] a ruling.”6 Arguments asserted but never pursued are not
a basis for appeal.7 Neither are “vague and ambiguous”
arguments or “fleeting contention[s]” made in the district court.8
Sometimes, a party advances one argument to the district
court and a different but related argument on appeal. Typically,
this won’t do. For example, in Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, Inc. v.
LMC Holding Co., the Tenth Circuit found a “palpable
distinction” between a challenge to the district court’s analysis
of a rule and a challenge to whether the rule applies at all.9
There’s an important caveat to all of these principles, one
that’s often overlooked. New arguments in support of the
decision below—that is, in support of affirming the district
court—are treated differently than novel appellate arguments for
reversal. The court of appeals traditionally “may affirm on any
basis supported by the record, even if it requires ruling on
arguments not reached by the district court or even presented . . .
on appeal.”10 This in turn means that an appellee is generally
free to raise any argument in support of affirmance, so long as
there’s some basis in the record for it and the appellant has had a
fair chance to address it.11 By contrast, a party seeking reversal
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of the district court’s decision based on a newly minted theory
faces an uphill climb, one shaped by the principles of waiver,
forfeiture, and plain error. We turn to those principles now.
III. WAIVER, FORFEITURE, AND THE PLAIN-ERROR STANDARD

05/10/2016 12:12:25

Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Okla. v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, 327 F.3d 1019, 1030
(10th Cir. 2003).
12. See United States v. Zubia-Torres, 550 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th Cir. 2008).
13. Richison, 634 F.3d at 1127.
14. See United States v. Teague, 443 F.3d 1310, 1314 (10th Cir. 2006); Eateries, Inc.
v. J.R. Simplot Co., 346 F.3d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir. 2003).
15. See United States v. Carrasco-Salazar, 494 F.3d 1270, 1272–73 (10th Cir. 2007).
16. Teague, 443 F.3d at 1314.
17. See Richison, 634 F.3d at 1128.
18. Id.
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Common parlance and even some judicial decisions often
fail to distinguish between arguments that are waived and
arguments that are forfeited. The two concepts are distinct, and
the differences can be, and often are, dispositive.
Waiver requires some intentional act by a party.12 It occurs
when a party has “intentionally relinquished or abandoned” an
argument either in the district court or on appeal.13 For example,
under the invited-error doctrine, a party may not induce action
by the district court and later seek reversal on the same ground.14
Likewise, a party may not appeal based on an argument she has
expressly abandoned.15 In either situation, a waiver has
occurred, and the party “is not entitled to appellate relief.”16
Forfeiture is different. It happens not by a deliberate act,
but by neglecting to present an argument to the district court.17
Unlike a waived argument, a forfeited argument may be grounds
for reversal on appeal, but only if affirming the district court
would result in plain error.18 Plain error generally requires the
proponent of the new argument to show “(1) error, (2) that is
plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4)
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
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judicial proceedings.”19 If each of these elements is satisfied, the
court “may exercise discretion to correct the error.”20
A. The Elements of Plain Error
Plain error has the unique distinction of being both a
standard of review and a multi-pronged test, and the court will
grant relief only if each prong of the test is satisfied. Still,
always bear in mind the driving force behind the test: preserving
the court’s discretion to correct “clear legal error that implicates
a miscarriage of justice.”21 As the Seventh Circuit has aptly put
it, relief is appropriate when a district court’s error “shakes
one’s faith in the judicial process.”22
1. Error
The first prong of the test goes to the merits of the forfeited
argument. It requires the appellant to explain why the district
court erred, or why error would otherwise result if the district
court’s ruling is affirmed. Sometimes, the court tackles this
element head-on, concludes there was no error, and declines to
address the remaining prongs of the test.23 In this situation, the
argument gets its day in court as if it were not forfeited.
2. Plain

05/10/2016 12:12:25

19. Id.; see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (referring to “plain”
error that affects both “substantial rights” and the “fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings”).
20. United States ex rel. Bahrani v. ConAgra, Inc., 624 F.3d 1275, 1284 (10th Cir.
2010) (quoting Therrien v. Target Corp., 617 F.3d 1242, 1253–54 (10th Cir. 2010)). The
standard as articulated by the Tenth Circuit is largely similar to the plain-error standards
employed by other circuits. See, e.g., Lopez v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 690 F.3d 869, 877 (8th
Cir. 2012); Hemmings v. Tidyman’s Inc., 285 F.3d 1174, 1193 (9th Cir. 2002).
21. Jordan, 668 F.3d at 1199.
22. United States v. Ross, 77 F.3d 1525, 1539 (7th Cir. 1996).
23. See Eller v. Trans Union, LLC, 739 F.3d 467, 480 (10th Cir. 2013); see also United
States v. Waller, 689 F.3d 947, 960 (8th Cir. 2012).
24. United States v. Bader, 678 F.3d 858, 868 (10th Cir. 2012).
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The second prong of the test examines whether the alleged
error is plain. To be plain, the error must be “clear or obvious
under current law.”24 “Clear or obvious” means that there is
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controlling precedent on point, either from the Supreme Court,
the relevant federal circuit, or (if the issue is one of state law)
the relevant state courts.25 In the absence of binding precedent,
the clear weight of authority in other federal circuits might make
an error plain.26 By contrast, a circuit split will almost always
foreclose a finding of plain error.27
The error must be clear or obvious “under current law.”28
Sometimes, a district court’s decision may be correct when
rendered but erroneous at the time of appeal due to an
intervening change in the law (such as new, binding precedent
from the Supreme Court). Prior to 2013, there was a circuit split
on how to handle this situation. The rule in the Tenth Circuit
was to assess the error “at the time of appeal.”29 The Supreme
Court recently affirmed this approach in Henderson v. United
States, drawing on the basic principle that “an appellate court
must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.”30
3. Affects Substantial Rights.
To satisfy the third prong of plain-error review, the
appellant must show that the error affected her “substantial

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 74 Side B
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25. See United States v. DeChristopher, 695 F.3d 1082, 1091 (10th Cir. 2012) (“In
general, for an error to be contrary to well-settled law, either the Supreme Court or this
court must have addressed the issue.” (citation omitted)); Therrien v. Target Corp., 617
F.3d 1242, 1253 (10th Cir. 2010) (looking to Oklahoma caselaw to determine that error
was not plain under Oklahoma law); Hornick v. Boyce, 280 Fed. App’x 770, 775–76 (10th
Cir. 2008) (noting that “this is an unsettled question under Colorado law, and the
[appellants] have therefore failed to show any plain error”).
26. See United States v. Hardwell, 80 F.3d 1471, 1484 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Although
neither the Supreme Court nor this court has decided the issue, given the weight of
authority from other circuits, we conclude that the error was sufficiently clear and obvious
to be plain error . . . .”).
27. See Teague, 443 F.3d at 1319 (“If neither the Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit
has ruled on the subject, we cannot find plain error if the authority in other circuits is
split.”); United States v. Wynn, 684 F.3d 473, 480 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that error was
not plain where “[o]ur court has never addressed the convergence argument, and the other
circuits are split on the issue”); cf. United States v. Story, 635 F.3d 1241, 1248, 1249 (10th
Cir. 2011) (noting that a circuit split is “strong evidence that an error is not plain,” but is
ultimately “not dispositive”).
28. Bader, 678 F.3d at 868.
29. United States v. Cordery, 656 F.3d 1103, 1107 (10th Cir. 2011).
30. ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1129 (quoting Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of City of
Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969)).
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rights.”31 This generally requires a showing of prejudice—“a
reasonable probability that, but for the error claimed, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.”32 Put otherwise,
the appellant must convince the court of appeals that the error
was not harmless.33 “[A]n error affecting a substantial right of a
party is an error which had a ‘substantial influence’ on the
outcome or [which] leaves one in ‘grave doubt’ as to whether it
had such effect.”34
This showing is easy when a district court’s plainly
erroneous ruling was dispositive of the case or of an issue.35 In
that situation, the error was clearly prejudicial. However, when
error is predicated on a district court’s incorrect evidentiary
ruling or erroneous jury instruction, a showing of prejudice is
much more difficult. The court of appeals must assess the error
in light of the entire record36 and must often make counterfactual
predictions about how a factfinder would have decided the case
in the absence of the error.37
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31. Richison, 634 F.3d at 1128.
32. Cordery, 656 F.3d at 1108 (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d
727, 733 (10th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. By statute and rule, appellate courts are required to ignore “harmless error,” that is,
error that does “not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2111
(Westlaw 2015); FED. R. CIV. P. 61 (Westlaw 2015); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) (Westlaw
2015); see also United States v. Kieffer, 681 F.3d 1143, 1158 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Rule 52(a)
harmless error analysis and the third or ‘substantial rights’ prong of Rule 52(b) plain error
analysis ‘normally require[] the same kind of inquiry.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Olano, 507 U.S. at 734)).
34. United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting United
States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc)) (alteration in original);
see also Perkins v. Silver Mountain Sports Club & Spa, LLC, 557 F.3d 1141, 1151 (10th
Cir. 2009) (indicating that under substantial-rights prong, proponent must show that error
“affected the outcome of the proceedings”).
35. See Flud v. United States ex rel. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 528 Fed. App’x 796,
799 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he district court dismissed Flud’s claim solely because he failed
to comply with § 19, which the Oklahoma Supreme Court has since ruled is void and
unconstitutional. Accordingly, the district court plainly erred in basing its dismissal on
Flud’s failure to comply with § 19.” (citation omitted)).
36. United States v. MacKay, 715 F.3d 807, 842 n.21 (10th Cir. 2013) (“In conducting
this analysis, we review the record as a whole.”); Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 796 F.2d
1307, 1312 (10th Cir. 1986) (“In determining whether plain error applies in this case, we
must view the instruction error in the context of the entire record.”).
37. See Ryan Dev. Co. v. Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 711 F.3d 1165, 1172
(10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Brooks, 736 F.3d 921, 936 (10th Cir. 2013); see also
United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 456 (2d Cir. 2005) (calling this a “mentally taxing
and inherently speculative task”).
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Although most kinds of error are amenable to harmlesserror analysis under the third prong of plain-error review, the
Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]here may be a special
category of forfeited errors that can be corrected regardless of
their effect on the outcome.”38 These so-called “structural
errors” are constitutional defects that “affect[] the framework
within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply . . . the trial
process itself.”39 Examples include the total denial of counsel, a
biased trial judge, or racial discrimination in jury selection.40
Like all arguments, a structural-error argument must first be
presented to the district court and, if unpreserved, is subject to
plain-error review. Yet because an analysis of its prejudicial
effect is impossible, it is likely that structural error automatically
satisfies the substantial-rights prong.41
4. Discretion.
If the first three prongs of the plain-error test are met, the
court then asks whether the error “seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”42 If so,
the court “may exercise discretion to correct the error.”43 This
final prong of the test is purely discretionary, and it’s impossible
to say in the abstract when it will apply. Courts typically
exercise their discretion “when an error is ‘particularly
egregious’ and the failure to remand for correction would
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 75 Side B
05/10/2016 12:12:25

38. Olano, 507 U.S. at 735.
39. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
U.S. 279, 310 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. GonzalezHuerta, 403 F.3d 727, 734 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[G]enerally speaking structural errors must,
at a minimum, be constitutional errors.”).
40. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 8 (citing cases).
41. The Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit have consistently reserved this question, see
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 140 (2009); Kieffer, 681 F.3d at 1158, but other
circuits have so held, see United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 527 (6th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 287 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. David, 83 F.3d
638, 647 (4th Cir. 1996).
42. E.g., Bahrani, 624 F.3d at 1284.
43. Id.
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produce a ‘miscarriage of justice.’”44 This standard is
“formidable.”45
At times, the Tenth Circuit has hinted at factors that help
guide its discretion to consider new arguments. The court is
more likely to consider a new argument if it presents a “strictly
legal question the proper resolution of which is beyond doubt,”46
or in “instances where public interest is implicated, . . . or where
manifest injustice would result.”47 In exercising its discretion,
the court is “mindful of the policies behind the general rule” of
preservation.48 Thus, whether the court will entertain an
unpreserved argument depends on, among other things, the
adequacy of the factual record; prejudice or unfair surprise to the
parties; whether the issue is antecedent to or dispositive of
another issue before the court; the age and complexity of the
case; the interests at stake, including the extent of liability faced
by one or more of the parties; and whether resolving the newly
raised issue allows the court to avoid a more difficult issue, such
as an unsettled constitutional question.49 Other circuits have
articulated similar considerations.50

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 76 Side A
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44. United States v. Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d 814, 820 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Gonzalez-Huerta); see also Herrera v. City of Albuquerque, 589 F.3d 1064, 1075 (10th
Cir. 2009) (similarly equating the fourth prong with a “miscarriage of justice”).
45. Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d at 820.
46. Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1539 (10th Cir. 1992); Petrini v. Howard,
918 F.2d 1482, 1483 n.4 (10th Cir. 1990).
47. Rademacher v. Colo. Ass’n of Soil Conservation Dists. Med. Benefit Plan, 11 F.3d
1567, 1572 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121 (“Certainly there are
circumstances in which a federal appellate court is justified in resolving an issue not passed
on below, as where the proper resolution is beyond any doubt, . . . or where ‘injustice
might otherwise result.’” (citation omitted)).
48. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966, 970 (10th Cir. 1991).
49. See United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1123–24 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc);
Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1229 (10th Cir. 1996); Hicks, 928 F.2d at
970–71.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Gewin, 759 F.3d 72, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Hayward v.
Cleveland Clinic Found., 759 F.3d 601, 615 (6th Cir. 2014); N.J. Carpenters & Trustees v.
Tishman Constr. Corp. of N.J., 760 F.3d 297, 305 (3d Cir. 2014).
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B. The Origins of Plain Error and Hints
of a Criminal-Civil Distinction
Preservation rules are probably as old as the judicial
system,51 though an exploration of their provenance is beyond
the scope of this article. For now, suffice it to note that the Tenth
Circuit and other appellate courts have long recognized the
ability, in both civil and criminal cases, to notice and correct a
“plain error” not presented to the court below.52
Today, plain-error jurisprudence is both rules-based and
judge-made. In criminal cases, it’s governed by Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 52(b), which provides that “[a] plain error
that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it
was not brought to the court’s attention.”53 Although there is no
comparable provision in the rules governing civil cases (except
with respect to erroneous jury instructions54 and rulings on
evidence,55 both discussed below), the appellate courts “have
recognized the possibility of plain error in other
circumstances,”56 and most courts apply the same plain-error
test in both criminal and civil appeals.57
Despite this seeming congruence, the caselaw suggests that
plain error has less stringent application in criminal cases. The
Supreme Court, for example, has noted that an appellate court
should correct unpreserved errors “especially in criminal
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 76 Side B
05/10/2016 12:12:25

51. See, e.g., Kerr v. Watts, 19 U.S. 550, 561 (1821) (“There can be no doubt that this
question passed sub silentio in the Court below, but it does not appear from any thing on
the record, that the point was waived . . . .”).
52. See Williams v. United States, 158 F. 30, 36 (8th Cir. 1907); Nat’l Bank of
Commerce v. First Nat’l Bank, 61 F. 809, 811–12 (8th Cir. 1894). Decisions of the Eighth
Circuit made prior to its division into the Eighth and Tenth Circuits in 1929 may be
binding in the Tenth Circuit. See Boynton v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 57 F.2d
772, 781 (10th Cir. 1932); but see Estate of McMorris v. Comm’r, 243 F.3d 1254, 1258
(10th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e have never held that the decisions of our predecessor circuit are
controlling in this court.”).
53. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) (Westlaw 2015).
54. FED. R. CIV. P. 51(d)(2) (Westlaw 2015).
55. FED. R. EVID. 103(e) (Westlaw 2015).
56. Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 358 F.3d 757, 769 (10th
Cir. 2004).
57. E.g., id. (noting that “[t]here is no ‘plain error’ provision in the rules governing
civil matters except with respect to erroneous instructions . . . and rulings on evidence,” but
acknowledging that “[i]n reviewing for plain error [in civil cases], we have used the
standard applied in criminal proceedings”); see also infra notes 61–62.
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cases.”58 The Tenth Circuit regularly states that “[t]he plain error
exception in civil cases . . . is an extraordinary, nearly
insurmountable burden”59—language that does not appear in
criminal cases, though the burden in criminal cases is often
described as “heavy” or “rigorous.”60 Several federal circuits
expressly recognize a criminal-civil distinction in applying plain
error.61 Others have gestured in this direction.62
III. PRESERVATION RULES IN UNIQUE CONTEXTS
The principles of waiver, forfeiture, and plain error
constitute the general rules of preservation, but there are some
legal contexts in which these rules either don’t apply or have
unique application.

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 77 Side A
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58. United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936) (referring to cases in which
“the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings”).
59. See, e.g., Phillips v. Hillcrest Med. Ctr., 244 F.3d 790, 802 (10th Cir. 2001)
(emphasis added); see also Richison, 634 F.3d at 1130 (“In civil cases [plain error] often
proves to be an ‘extraordinary, nearly insurmountable burden[.]’” (quoting Employers
Reinsurance, 358 F.3d at 770)).
60. See United States v. Archuleta, 737 F.3d 1287, 1296 (10th Cir. 2013); MacKay, 715
F.3d at 831 n.17.
61. See Danco, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 178 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[Olano]
was a criminal case but in this circuit, the same requirements are commonly imposed in
civil cases, and even more stringently.”); C.B. v. City of Sonora, 769 F.3d 1005, 1016 (9th
Cir. 2014) (“[T]he plain error standard of review in the civil context is similar to, but
stricter than, the plain error standard of review applied in criminal cases.”); United States v.
Levy, 391 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[A]lthough . . . we may notice plain error in civil
cases, we have also reasoned that its scope is significantly narrower in that context.”
(citation omitted)).
62. See Williams, 399 F.3d at 455 (“[T]he ability of appellate courts to correct
unpreserved error might be greater in criminal cases . . . .”); Watson v. O’Neill, 365 F.3d
609, 615 (8th Cir. 2004) (“The plain-error exception ‘must be confined to the most
compelling cases, especially in civil, as opposed to criminal, litigation.’” (quoting Johnson
v. Ashby, 808 F.2d 676, 679 n.3 (8th Cir. 1987))); Ocean Atl. Dev. Corp. v. Aurora
Christian Sch., Inc., 322 F.3d 983, 1005 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Although forfeited arguments
typically remain subject to review for plain error in criminal cases, the plain error doctrine
will rarely permit this court to reach forfeited arguments in civil litigation.”); Fashauer v.
N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 57 F.3d 1269, 1289 (3d Cir. 1995) (“If anything, the
plain error power in the civil context—which is judicially rather than statutorily created—
should be used even more sparingly.”).
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A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Sovereign Immunity
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63. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986) (quoting
Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982)).
64. See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456 (2004).
65. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982).
66. United States ex rel. Burlbaw v. Orenduff, 548 F.3d 931, 942 (10th Cir. 2008).
67. Id.
68. Gonzalez v. Thaler, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012) (quoting Henderson
v. Shinseki, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202–03 (2011)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
69. See Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013).
70. Id.

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 77 Side B

Subject matter jurisdiction is a limitation on the
adjudicatory power of the federal courts and “an inseparable
element of the constitutional system of checks and balances.” 63
It cannot be conferred by the parties’ consent and so is not
subject to principles of waiver and forfeiture. A party may
challenge subject matter jurisdiction at any point in the
proceedings—for the first time on appeal, or even for the first
time in the Supreme Court.64 Indeed, federal courts are required
to raise the issue sua sponte whenever subject matter jurisdiction
“does not affirmatively appear in the record.”65
The rule for sovereign immunity is similar: Sovereign
immunity may be raised for the first time on appeal.66 But unlike
subject matter jurisdiction, sovereign immunity is waivable, and
the court may, but need not, consider the issue sua sponte.67
Because jurisdictional issues are not subject to the
principles of waiver and forfeiture, appellants often seek to
characterize newly raised arguments—particularly arguments
based on statutory language—as jurisdictional in nature. The
Supreme Court “has endeavored in recent years to bring some
discipline to the use of the term ‘jurisdictional.’”68 It has
adopted what it calls a “readily administrable bright line”: Has
Congress “clearly stated that the rule is jurisdictional”?69 If not,
the restriction is non-jurisdictional and is subject to the rules of
waiver and forfeiture.70
The Tenth Circuit “has always maintained a distinction
between its obligation to consider arguments which might
undermine its subject matter jurisdiction and arguments which
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might support it.”71 New appellate arguments in support of
jurisdiction or opposing sovereign immunity are treated
differently than new arguments contesting jurisdiction or
asserting sovereign immunity. The former are subject to plainerror review; the latter are not.72
B. Objections to Evidence

05/10/2016 12:12:25

71. Somerlott v. Cherokee Nation Distributors, Inc., 686 F.3d 1144, 1152 (10th Cir.
2012) (citing Daigle).
72. See id.; Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1539 (“[O]ur responsibility to ensure even sua sponte
that we have subject matter jurisdiction before considering a case differs from our
discretion to eschew untimely raised legal theories which may support that jurisdiction. . . .
We have no duty under the general waiver rule to consider the latter.” (citation omitted)).
73. FED. R. EVID. 103(a) (Westlaw 2015).
74. Nat’l Envtl. Serv. Co. v. Ronan Eng’g Co., 256 F.3d 995, 1001 (10th Cir. 2001).
75. FED. R. EVID. 103(e) (Westlaw 2015).
76. See Prager v. Campbell Cnty. Memorial Hosp., 731 F.3d 1046, 1054 (10th Cir.
2013).
77. FED. R. EVID. 103(a), (b) (Westlaw 2015).
78. National Environmental, 256 F.3d at 1001.
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Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a) requires a party to timely
object or make an offer of proof when the district court
erroneously admits or excludes evidence.73 Claims of
evidentiary error, if properly preserved, are reviewed for abuse
of discretion.74 If a party does not timely object to the admission
or exclusion of evidence, Rule 103(e) states that “[a] court may
take notice of a plain error affecting a substantial right.”75 This
is the familiar plain-error standard.76
Often, a party will tee up an evidentiary issue through a
pretrial motion in limine. If the court rules on the motion, is it
necessary for a party to renew an objection or offer of proof at
trial? Rule 103(b) seems to say no: “Once the [district] court
rules definitively on the record—either before or at trial—a
party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a
claim of error for appeal.”77 Yet the Tenth Circuit has added its
own gloss to this requirement. It applies a three-part test, called
the contemporaneous-objection rule, to determine whether a
party must object at the time of trial (when the evidence is
actually admitted or excluded) in order to preserve objections
made in an earlier motion in limine.78 A party need not
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contemporaneously object if “(1) the matter was adequately
presented to the district court; (2) the issue was of a type that
can be finally decided prior to trial; and (3) the court’s ruling
was definitive.”79
1. Adequately Presented
The “key inquiry” under the first prong of the test is
“whether trial counsel substantially satisfied the requirement of
putting the court on notice as to his concern.”80 It’s best to
commit the issue to writing through, for example, a motion in
limine81 or a trial brief.82 If objection must be made orally, the
court is a bit more generous, recognizing that “in the heat of a
trial, counsel might not explain the evidentiary basis of his
argument as thoroughly as might ideally be desired.”83
2. Amenable to Final Pretrial Determination
To excuse a party from having to contemporaneously
object, the evidentiary issue must be “of a type that could be
decided prior to trial.”84 Not every issue will meet this standard,
as
some evidentiary issues are akin to questions of law, and
the decision to admit such evidence is not dependent upon
the character of the other evidence admitted at trial. . . . On
the other hand, some admission decisions are fact-bound
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 78 Side B
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79. Id. (quoting Pandit v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 82 F.3d 376, 380 (10th Cir. 1996))
(internal quotation marks omitted). To implement the contemporaneous objection rule, the
Tenth Circuit’s local rules require principal briefs to “cite the precise reference in the
record where a required objection was made and ruled on.” 10TH CIR. R. 28.2(C)(3)
(2016).
80. Prager, 731 F.3d at 1054 (citation omitted).
81. See National Environmental, 256 F.3d at 1001 (“Here, the issues were adequately
presented to the district court in NESCO’s initial motion in limine . . . .”).
82. Pandit v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 82 F.3d 376, 380 (10th Cir.1996) (noting that
counsel “argued the question” in trial briefs).
83. Prager, 731 F.3d at 1054 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153,
174 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. National Environmental, 256 F.3d at 1001.

37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 79 Side A

05/10/2016 12:12:25

SPEIRMOHEBBIRESEND2 (DO NOT DELETE)

5/9/2016 5:38 PM

PRESERVATION RULES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS

295

determinations dependent upon the character of the
85
evidence introduced at trial.

Examples of evidentiary issues not amenable to final pretrial
determination are relevance of a given piece of evidence and
whether relevant evidence is unduly prejudicial. To properly
preserve these issues for appeal, a party must interpose a
contemporaneous objection.86
3. Definitive
Finally, the district court’s ruling must be “definitive.”
Sometimes, a district court will make a “conditional” ruling on a
motion in limine. For example, a party might move pretrial to
exclude certain evidence as irrelevant. Since relevance is often
hard to assess in the abstract, a district court may “conditionally
deny” the motion and reserve a final ruling for trial. In this
situation, the party must raise a contemporaneous objection
when the evidence is actually introduced at trial. Failure to do so
means forfeiture and plain-error review.87
C. Jury Instructions

05/10/2016 12:12:25

85. United States v. Mejia-Alarcon, 995 F.2d 982, 987 (10th Cir. 1993) (citations
omitted).
86. See id. at 985 n.1, 987 n.3; United States v. McGlothin, 705 F.3d 1254, 1260 n.9
(10th Cir. 2013).
87. See McGlothin, 705 F.3d at 1260 & n.9.
88. See FED. R. CIV. P. 51(c)(2) (Westlaw 2015).
89. Therrien, 617 F.3d at 1252 (quoting Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co. v. Choren, 393
F.3d 1175, 1179 (10th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To implement this
requirement, the Tenth Circuit’s local rules require principal briefs to “cite the precise
reference in the record where a required objection was made and ruled on.” This is the
same rule applicable to evidentiary objections. 10TH CIR. R. 28.2(C)(3).
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Objections to jury instructions in civil cases are governed
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51, which requires
objections to be timely raised in the district court.88 Under the
Tenth Circuit’s jurisprudence, “the objection must proffer the
same grounds raised on appeal with sufficient clarity to render
the grounds obvious, plain, or unmistakable.”89 If an objection is
not properly preserved, Rule 51(d)(2) provides that “[a] court
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may consider a plain error in the instructions . . . if the error
affects substantial rights.”90
In criminal cases, objections to jury instructions must also
be “timely and specific.”91 Failure to preserve an objection
results in review for plain error under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 52(b).92 Whether civil Rule 51(d)(2) or criminal Rule
52(b) applies, the four-prong plain-error test is the same.93
D. Preservation in Criminal Cases
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), which governs
unpreserved errors in criminal cases, provides that “[a] plain
error that affects substantial rights may be considered even
though it was not brought to the court’s attention.”94 The
Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in United States v. Olano95
remains the principal precedent construing this rule. Under
Olano, all forfeited errors in a criminal proceeding are subject to
Rule 52(b), regardless of how serious the alleged error may be.96
Although the Tenth Circuit has never so held, the Second
Circuit has persuasively reasoned that plain-error review under
Rule 52 should have less stringent application to sentencing
errors than to errors occurring in the conduct of a jury trial.97
The reason is the difference in judicial and social costs. “A
resentencing is a brief event, normally taking less than a day and
requiring the attendance of only the defendant, counsel, and
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 79 Side B
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90. FED. R. CIV. P. 51(d)(2) (Westlaw 2015).
91. Bader, 678 F.3d at 867.
92. Kieffer, 681 F.3d at 1157.
93. See id.
94. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) (Westlaw 2015).
95. 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
96. See id. at 731 (noting that “‘a constitutional right,’ or a right of any other sort, ‘may
be forfeited in criminal . . . cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right ’”
(quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944))); United States v. Reyna, 358
F.3d 344, 350 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (pointing out that “the [Supreme] Court [in Olano]
suggested that all forfeited errors in a criminal proceeding are subject to Rule 52(b)
analysis” regardless of “the seriousness of the claimed error”); see also United States v.
Luepke, 495 F.3d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he seriousness of claimed errors does not
operate to remove them from Rule 52(b).”).
97. See United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d at 456–58; see also Gonzalez-Huerta, 403
F.3d at 755 (Briscoe, J., concurring) (citing Williams).
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court personnel.”98 A second trial is much more costly in terms
of “time, resources, and disruption in the lives of participants,”
and so, to remedy unpreserved error, a court should order a
second trial only “sparingly.”99
When the issue on appeal concerns a criminal defendant’s
waiver of a right rather than forfeiture of an error, Rule 52 does
not apply, and special considerations come into play. Most of a
criminal defendant’s rights are waivable, but some, like jury
unanimity, are not.100 Courts must also consider whether the
waiver requires personal participation by the defendant, whether
certain procedures are required for waiver, and whether the
defendant’s choice must be particularly informed or
voluntary.101
E. Waiving the Waiver, Forfeiting the Forfeiture

05/10/2016 12:12:25

98. Williams, 399 F.3d at 456.
99. Id.
100. Teague, 443 F.3d at 1316–17.
101. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 733; Teague, 443 F.3d at 1317.
102. See United States v. McGehee, 672 F.3d 860, 873 n.5 (10th Cir. 2012); see also
Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 618 F.3d 1127, 1139 (10th Cir. 2010); Niemi v. Lasshofer,
728 F.3d 1252, 126–62 (10th Cir. 2013) (refusing to entertain forfeiture argument where
appellee failed to assert forfeiture in its answer brief and raised it for the first time in a Rule
28(j) letter following oral argument).
103. See Cook, 618 F.3d at 1139 (“Plaintiffs have themselves forfeited any forfeiture
argument they may have on this issue, and this court will consider the merits of
Defendants’ argument.”); Abernathy v. Wandes, 713 F.3d 538, 552 (10th Cir. 2013).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Heckenliable, 446 F.3d 1048, 1049 n.3 (10th Cir. 2006).
105. Teague, 443 F.3d at 1314 (emphasis omitted).
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Waiver and forfeiture are substantive arguments that must
be asserted on appeal if a party wants the court to consider them.
An appellee’s failure to interpose a forfeiture defense when it
clearly applies is itself a forfeiture, and the Tenth Circuit is more
likely in that instance to “overlook” a preservation problem and
reach the merits of an issue.102 This is known as “forfeiting the
forfeiture,”103 though the court sometimes (incorrectly) calls it
“waiving the waiver.”104
If true waiver has occurred, the Tenth Circuit has
admonished that “a party that has waived a right is not entitled
to appellate relief.”105 Nonetheless, the court will reach the
merits of a waived argument in criminal cases when the
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government fails to invoke the waiver on appeal.106 Whether the
court would follow a similar path in civil cases is not clear. We
have uncovered no civil case in the Tenth Circuit in which an
appellee’s failure to invoke waiver on appeal led the court to
take up an argument that the appellant had waived in the district
court.107
IV. APPELLATE BRIEFING AND ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellate briefs and oral argument are the primary vehicles
for presenting arguments to the federal courts of appeals, and
they come with their own set of preservation rules.
A. Briefs and Oral Argument
1. Opening Brief
The appellant’s opening brief to the court of appeals is allimportant. It is “the most highly structured of all the briefs,”108
and it must contain, among other things, “appellant’s
contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the
authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant
relies.”109 An argument or issue not raised in an opening brief is
“deemed waived,”110 and the court “will not address it on the
merits.”111
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 80 Side B
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106. See United States v. Contreras-Ramos, 457 F.3d 1144, 1145 (10th Cir. 2006)
(“[T]he waiver is waived when the government utterly neglects to invoke the waiver in this
court.” (quoting United States v. Calderon, 428 F.3d 928, 930-31 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Reider, 103 F.3d 99, 103 n.1 (10th Cir. 1996).
107. But the Tenth Circuit seems at least to have recognized the possibility. See, e.g.,
Planned Parenthood of Kan. & Mid-Mo. v. Moser, 747 F.3d 814, 837 (10th Cir. 2014)
(“Sometimes it may even be improper not to consider an issue waived by the parties.”);
Richison, 634 F.3d at 1127 (“If the theory was intentionally relinquished or abandoned in
the district court, we usually deem it waived and refuse to consider it.”) (emphasis added).
108. 16AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3974.1, 230 (4th ed. 2008).
109. Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting FED. R. APP.
P. 28(a)(9)(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. Murphy v. Sloan, 764 F.3d 1144, 1152 n.9 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that the issue
was raised neither in the opening brief on appeal nor in the trial court); Becker v. Kroll,
494 F.3d 904, 913 n.6 (10th Cir. 2007).
111. Bowdry v. United Airlines, Inc., 58 F.3d 1483, 1490 (10th Cir. 1995). Technically,
of course, the omission of arguments in an opening brief is a forfeiture, not a waiver. See
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The same is true if an argument is “inadequately presented”
in an opening brief.112 “[W]e expect attorneys appearing before
this court to state the issues on appeal expressly and clearly,
with theories adequately identified and supported with proper
argument,” the Tenth Circuit has said.113 Thus, “[s]cattered
statements,”114 “bald assertions,”115 and issues briefed “in a
perfunctory manner,” without citations to authority or the record
and without developed argumentation,116 are not enough to
preserve an issue for appeal. As the Sixth Circuit has put it, “[i]t
is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the
most skeletal way, leaving the court to . . . put flesh on its
bones.”117
2. Reply Brief
Generally, the court will not consider an argument raised
for the first time in a reply brief.118 This would be unfair to both
the appellee, who has no opportunity for a written response, and
the court itself, which would “run the risk of an improvident or
ill-advised opinion, given [its] dependence . . . on the adversarial
process for sharpening the issues for decision.”119 Nonetheless,
the Tenth Circuit “make[s] an exception when the new issue
argued in the reply brief is offered in response to an argument
raised in the appellee’s brief,”120 especially if the appellee has
posited an alternative ground for affirmance.121 And, of course,
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 81 Side A
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Bronson, 500 F.3d at 1104. But it’s a forfeiture that, like waiver, results in the court’s
refusal to consider the issue; hence the term “deemed waiver.”
112. Bronson, 500 F.3d at 1104.
113. Reedy v. Werholtz, 660 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 2011).
114. Exum v. United States Olympic Comm., 389 F.3d 1130, 1133 n.4 (10th Cir. 2004).
115. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th Cir. 1998).
116. Gray v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 672 F.3d 909, 915 (10th Cir. 2012).
117. Hayward, 759 F.3d at 618 n.9 (alteration in original) (quoting McPherson v.
Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. See United States v. Bass, 661 F.3d 1299, 1301 n.1 (10th Cir. 2011). Such
arguments are also “deemed waived.” Byrd v. Workman, 645 F.3d 1159, 1166 n.8 (10th
Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Harrell, 642 F.3d 907, 918 (10th Cir. 2011)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
119. Hill v. Kemp, 478 F.3d 1236, 1251 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Headrick v. Rockwell
Int’l Corp., 24 F.3d 1272, 1278 (10th Cir. 1994) (White, J.)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
120. Beaudry v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 331 F.3d 1164, 1166 n.3 (10th Cir. 2003).
121. United States v. Brown, 348 F.3d 1200, 1213 (10th Cir. 2003).
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if the argument pertains to (a lack of) subject-matter jurisdiction,
the court is obliged to consider it.122
It bears re-emphasis that, like most preservation rules, the
rule against new arguments in reply is discretionary. Whether
the court will consider such an argument depends on the
complexity of the question,123 the adequacy of the factual
record, whether the parties addressed the issue in the district
court,124 and (perhaps) a need to avoid manifest injustice.125
3. Oral Argument
Oral argument is an important part of the appellate process.
“It contributes to judicial accountability, it guards against undue
reliance upon staff work, and it promotes understanding in ways
that cannot be matched by written communication.”126 It also
“assures the litigant that his case has been given consideration
by those charged with deciding it.”127 But oral argument is no
place to “supplement” the record or the briefs.128 Indeed, Tenth
Circuit “precedent holds that issues may not be raised for the
first time at oral argument.”129
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122. See Sadeghi v. INS, 40 F.3d 1139, 1143 (10th Cir. 1994) (indicating that the court
“generally” will not “consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief . . . except
when those issues relate to jurisdictional requirements”).
123. United States v. Jenkins, 904 F.2d 549, 554 n.3 (10th Cir. 1990).
124. See Coit v. Zavaras, 280 F. App’x 791, 793 (10th Cir. 2008) (indicating that both
parties addressed the issue in the district court).
125. See Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 1173 n.12 (10th Cir. 2012) (exercising
discretion to consider and reject new argument raised in reply brief filed in capital case,
and noting that new argument would not warrant court’s reaching a different result).
126. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 108, at § 3980 (quoting Commission on Revision of the
Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for
Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 254–255 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Id.
128. See Nero v. Rice, 986 F.2d 1428, at *2 (10th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table
decision).
129. United States v. Abdenbi, 361 F.3d 1282, 1289 (10th Cir. 2004).
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B. The Rule of Richison: Appellant’s Affirmative Duty
to Raise Plain Error

05/10/2016 12:12:25

130. 634 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2011).
131. Id. at 1131.
132. See id.; MacKay, 715 F.3d at 813 n.17 (“[A]n appellant carries the heavy burden of
satisfying plain error. And if an appellant fails to satisfy that burden, we do not develop a
plain error argument for the appellant.” (citation omitted)).
133. MacKay, 715 F.3d at 831, 831 n.17.
134. See Cook, 618 F.3d at 1138–39.
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Richison v. Ernest Group, Inc.,130 addressed an appellant
who raised a new argument on appeal but failed to explain how
it satisfied plain-error review. Refusing to consider the
argument, the court held that “the failure to argue for plain error
and its application on appeal . . . marks the end of the road for an
argument for reversal not first presented to the district court.”131
Under Richison, the appellant has an affirmative duty to explain
how a newly raised argument satisfies each prong of the plainerror test. The court will not, on its own, craft a plain-error
argument for the appellant.132
After Richison, it is not clear how an appellant fulfills her
duty to raise plain error. Must she argue for plain-error review in
her opening brief? Or is it sufficient to make the argument in a
reply brief, or even at oral argument? So far, the Tenth Circuit
has punted on these questions.133
In our view, the appellant should not be required to
articulate a plain-error argument in her opening brief. She
should be permitted to raise it in a reply brief, and then only if
it’s necessary. Recall that forfeiture is akin to an affirmative
defense, and if an appellee doesn’t raise the forfeiture, the court
is free to proceed to the merits of the issue.134 A rule requiring
the appellant to argue for plain error in her opening brief would
put the cart before the horse, requiring the appellant to raise her
own forfeiture at the outset. Plus, there are many reasons why
the appellee may want to forego a forfeiture argument on appeal.
Perhaps the appellee also wants the court to rule on the merits of
the issue. Perhaps it’s not clear whether a forfeiture occurred,
and the appellee prefers not to sidetrack the court into a tedious
review of the record and arguments below. In any event,
forfeiture is the appellee’s prerogative to raise. If the appellee
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fails to raise forfeiture in her answer brief, the appellant need not
address it. If, on the other hand, the appellee does raise it, the
appellant should be permitted in her reply brief to address the
forfeiture and articulate a plain-error argument.135
Whether an appellant may invoke plain error for the first
time at oral argument is not clear. The Tenth Circuit has, on at
least one occasion, addressed a plain-error argument raised for
the first time at oral argument, though it ultimately found no
plain error.136
III. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

05/10/2016 12:12:25

135. See McKay, 715 F.3d at 831 n.17 (“[W]e do not discount the possibility that we
may consider a plain error argument made for the first time in an appellant’s reply brief.”);
Beaudry, 331 F.3d at 1166 n.3 (recognizing that new issue may be raised in reply brief if it
is “offered in response to an argument raised in the appellee’s brief”); cf. Somerlott., 686
F.3d at 1151 (providing appellant opportunity to present plain-error argument in
supplemental briefing, but concluding that she failed to do so).
136. Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, 497 F.3d at 1142–43.
137. See Hill, 478 F.3d at 1251.
138. Niemi, 728 F.3d at 1259.
139. Josh Chetwynd, Play Ball? An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration, Its Use in Major
League Baseball and Its Potential Applicability to European Football Wage and Transfer
Disputes, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 109, 110 (2009) (explaining “baseball arbitration” by
noting that “[t]his type of dispute resolution forces an arbitrator, or panel of arbitrators, to
pick either one party’s offer or the other’s”); see also Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. CanonMcMillan Sch. Dist., 152 F.3d 228, 233 n.1 (3d Cir. 1998) (“What may be appropriate for
baseball salary arbitration is not necessarily appropriate for the law courts.”).
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We began this article by noting the limited power of Article
III courts to decide the issues the parties present for their review.
The Tenth Circuit frequently reiterates that it depends heavily on
the adversarial process to fully air the parties’ positions, sharpen
the issues for review, and avoid ill-informed decisions.137 As the
court recently put it, “[i]n our adversarial system we don’t
usually go looking for trouble but rely instead on the parties to
identify the issues we must decide.”138
Still, judicial decisionmaking isn’t like baseball
arbitration—it’s not a binary either-or exercise.139 A federal
court of appeals isn’t limited to sifting the parties’ positions and
selecting the position it likes best, nor is it bound by the parties’
framing of a particular issue. “[W]hen an issue or claim is
properly before the court, the court is not limited to the
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particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather
retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper
construction of governing law.”140 So, for example, even if the
parties agree that a contract is unambiguous (but differ on its
meaning), the court is free to decide otherwise.141 Or, where one
party says a statute, contract, or case means “A” and the other
says it means “B,” the court may decide that it means “C.”142
The court is more likely to address an issue not identified or
briefed by parties if the issue is “antecedent to and ultimately
dispositive of the dispute.”143
The court’s inherent power to consider unraised issues only
underscores the discretionary nature of appellate preservation
rules. The rules are not mechanistic formulas. Rather, they
“confer[] a discretion that may be exercised at any time, no
matter what may have been done at some other time.”144 The
facts of individual cases matter.145 Even stare decisis does not
fully control a court’s power to consider unpreserved arguments
on appeal.146
Because preservation rules live in the realm of judicial
discretion, counsel do well to remember the reasons behind the
rules. As we have seen, the rules vindicate structural values, like
respect for the division of labor between trial and appellate
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140. Moser, 747 F.3d at 837 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Nat’l Bank v.
Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 446 (1993)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
141. See id.
142. See Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Nanodetex Corp., 733 F.3d 1018, 1024 (10th Cir.
2013) (indicating that the court disagreed with both parties); Fricke v. Sec’y of Navy, 509
F.3d 1287, 1289 (10th Cir. 2007) (indicating that “both parties’ arguments are based on an
incorrect reading of our case”); see also In re Beineke, 690 F.3d 1344, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (“[T]he parties offer quite different interpretations of the statute. . . . [W]e conclude
that neither party is entirely correct.”).
143. Moser, 747 F.3d at 837 (quoting U.S. Nat’l Bank, 508 U.S. at 447) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
144. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 362 (1910); Abernathy, 713 F.3d at 552
(“[T]he decision regarding what issues are appropriate to entertain on appeal in instances of
lack of preservation is discretionary.”).
145. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121 (recognizing that whether to take up an issue not raised
at trial is a matter of discretion “to be exercised on the facts of individual cases”).
146. Weems, 217 U.S. at 362 (“[T]he [plain-error] rule is not altogether controlled by
precedent.”); United States v. Vanover, 630 F.3d 1108, 1123 n.10 (8th Cir. 2011) (Riley, J.,
concurring) (“[T]hat stare decisis applies in the plain-error context seems doubtful in light
of Weems.”). Still, the Tenth Circuit will consider how it has resolved similar cases in the
past. See United States v. Hill, 749 F.3d 1250, 1266–67 (10th Cir. 2014).
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courts, and prudential values, like allowing the court to avoid
difficult or unresolved questions of law. Of course,
considerations of fairness are paramount. On the one hand,
preservation rules help avoid prejudice and unfair surprise to the
parties. On the other hand, appellate courts must retain the
power to correct plain errors that implicate a fundamental
miscarriage of justice, even if the error was not noticed below.
Every case involving forfeiture, waiver, or some other
aspect of preservation is an attempt to strike a sensible balance
among these competing considerations. Although the legal
formulas (like the four-part plain-error test) matter, perhaps
more important is the court’s own sense of how these various
considerations align with the facts and posture of a particular
case. Prudent counsel, in her briefing and oral argument, will
assist the court in striking the right judicial balance.
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